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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have demonstrated ex-
ceptional performance on most recognition tasks such as
image classification and segmentation. However, they have
also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples.
This phenomenon has recently attracted a lot of attention
but it has not been extensively studied on multiple, large-
scale datasets and structured prediction tasks such as se-
mantic segmentation which often require more specialised
networks with additional components such as CRFs, dilated
convolutions, skip-connections and multiscale processing.
In this paper, we present what to our knowledge is the
first rigorous evaluation of adversarial attacks on mod-
ern semantic segmentation models, using two large-scale
datasets. We analyse the effect of different network architec-
tures, model capacity and multiscale processing, and show
that many observations made on the task of classification
do not always transfer to this more complex task. Further-
more, we show how mean-field inference in deep structured
models, multiscale processing (and more generally, input
transformations) naturally implement recently proposed ad-
versarial defenses. Our observations will aid future efforts
in understanding and defending against adversarial exam-
ples. Moreover, in the shorter term, we show how to effec-
tively benchmark robustness and show which segmentation
models should currently be preferred in safety-critical ap-
plications due to their inherent robustness.
1. Introduction
Computer vision has progressed to the point where Deep
Neural Network (DNN) models for most recognition tasks
such as classification or segmentation have become a widely
available commodity. State-of-the-art performance on vari-
ous datasets has increased at an unprecedented pace, and as
a result, these models are now being deployed in more and
more complex systems. However, despite DNNs perform-
ing exceptionally well in absolute performance scores, they
have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples – images which are classified incorrectly (often with
high confidence), although there is only a minimal percep-
tual difference with correctly classified inputs [28, 10, 83].
This raises doubts about DNNs being used in safety-
critical applications such as driverless vehicles [47] or med-
ical diagnosis [30] since the networks could inexplica-
bly classify a natural input incorrectly although it is al-
most identical to examples it has classified correctly be-
fore (Fig. 1). Moreover, it allows for the possibility of ma-
licious agents attacking systems that use neural networks
[54, 70, 77, 32]. Hence, the robustness of networks per-
turbed by adversarial noise may be as important as the pre-
dictive accuracy on clean inputs. And if multiple models
achieve comparable performance, we should always con-
sider deploying the one which is inherently most robust to
adversarial examples in (safety-critical) production settings.
This phenomenon has recently attracted a lot of attention
and numerous strategies have been proposed to train DNNs
to be more robust to adversarial examples [38, 55, 73, 63].
However, these defenses are not universal; they have fre-
quently been found to be vulnerable to other types of at-
tacks [18, 16, 17, 44] and/or come at the cost of perfor-
mance penalties on clean inputs [19, 40, 63]. To the best of
our knowledge, adversarial examples have not been exten-
sively analysed beyond standard image classification mod-
els, and often on small datasets such as MNIST or CIFAR-
10 [63, 40, 73]. Hence, the vulnerability of modern DNNs
to adversarial attacks on more complex tasks such as se-
mantic segmentation in the context of real-world datasets
covering different domains remains unclear.
In this paper, we present what to our knowledge is the
first rigorous evaluation of the robustness of semantic seg-
mentation models to adversarial attacks. We focus on se-
mantic segmentation, since it is a significantly more com-
plex task than image classification [8]. This has also been
witnessed by the fact that state-of-the-art semantic seg-
mentation models are typically based on standard image
classification architectures [53, 80, 43], extended by addi-
tional components such as dilated convolutions [21, 90],
specialised pooling [22, 92], skip-connections [60], Condi-
tional Random Fields (CRFs) [93, 1] and/or multiscale pro-
cessing [22, 20] whose impact on the robustness has never
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(a) Input image (perturbed half on right) (b) Ground Truth (c) PSPNet [92]
(d) DilatedNet [90] (e) ICNet [91] (f) CRF-RNN [93]
Figure 1: The left hand side shows the original image, and the right the output when modified with imperceptible adversarial
perturbations. There is a large variance in how each network’s performance is degraded, even though the perturbations
are created individually for each network with the same ℓ∞ norm of 4. We rigorously analyse a diverse range of state-of-
the-art segmentation networks, observing how architectural properties, such as residual connections, multiscale processing
and CRFs, and input transformations, all influence adversarial robustness. These observations will help future efforts to
understand and defend against adversarial examples, whilst in the short term they suggest which networks should currently
be preferred in safety-critical applications.
been thoroughly studied.
First, we analyse the robustness of various DNN ar-
chitectures to adversarial examples and show that the
Deeplab v2 network [22] is significantly more robust than
approaches which achieve better prediction scores on public
benchmarks [92]. Thereafter, we show that adversarial ex-
amples are less effective when processed at different scales.
Furthermore, multiscale networks are more robust to multi-
ple different attacks and white-box attacks on them produce
more transferable perturbations. Inspired by the effect of
multiscale processing, we examine other input transforma-
tions which neural networks are not invariant to and show
that they are markedly more robust to transformed adversar-
ial examples. However, we also show that this is true only
when the attack generation process does not take knowledge
of these input transformations into account; otherwise, the
robustness improvements are rather marginal. These obser-
vation have important implications on producing effective
physical adversarial examples in the real world. On a sep-
arate track, we also show that structured prediction models
have a similar effect as “gradient-masking” defense strate-
gies [71, 73]. As such, mean field CRF inference increases
robustness to untargeted adversarial attacks, but in contrast
to the gradient masking defense, it also improves the net-
work’s predictive accuracy. Another of our contributions
shows that some widely accepted observations about robust-
ness and model size or iterative attacks, which were made in
the context of image classification [55, 63] do not transfer
to semantic segmentation and different, real-world datasets.
Moreover, we also show that proposed adversarial defenses
should be evaluated prudently by using knowledge of the
defense mechanism in the white-box attack to test it, which
was not done in previously [41, 86, 56, 24]. Finally, in con-
trast to the prior art [55, 59], our experiments are carried
out on two large-scale, real-world datasets and (most of)
our observations remained consistent across them.
We believe our findings will facilitate future efforts in
understanding and defending against adversarial examples
without compromising predictive accuracy.
2. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial perturbations cause a classifier to change its
original prediction, when added to the original input x. This
phenomenon was initially studied in the context of malware
detection and spam classification [10, 28], and has more re-
cently become popular in the context of computer vision.
For a neural network f parametrised by θ that maps x ∈ Rm
to y, a target class from L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, Szegedy et al.
[83] defined an adversarial perturbation r as the solution to
the optimisation problem
argmin ‖r‖2 subject to f(x+ r; θ) = yt, (1)
where yt is the target label of the adversarial example
xadv = x + r. For clarity of exposition, we consider only
a single label y. This naturally generalises to the case of
semantic segmentation where networks are trained with an
independent cross-entropy loss at each pixel.
Constraining the neural network to output y is difficult to
optimise. Hence, [83] added an additional term to the ob-
jective based on the loss function used to train the network
argmin
r
c‖r‖2 + L(f(x+ r; θ), yt). (2)
Here, L is the loss function between the network prediction
and desired target, and c is a positive scalar. Szegedy et
al. [83] solved this using L-BFGS, and [18] and [23] have
proposed further advances using surrogate loss functions.
However, this method is computationally very expensive
as it requires several minutes to produce a single attack.
Hence, the following methods are used in practice:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [38]. FGSM pro-
duces adversarial examples by increasing the loss (usually
the cross-entropy) of the network on the input x as
xadv = x+ ǫ · sign(∇xL(f(x; θ), y)). (3)
This is a single-step, untargeted attack, which approxi-
mately minimises the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation bounded
by the parameter ǫ.
FGSM ll [55]. This single-step attack encourages the
network to classify the adversarial example as yt by assign-
ing
xadv = x− ǫ · sign(∇xL(f(x; θ), yt)). (4)
We follow the convention of choosing the target class as
the least likely class predicted by the network [55].
Iterative FGSM [55, 63]. This attack extends FGSM
by applying it in an iterative manner, which increases the
chance of fooling the original network. Using the subscript
to denote the iteration number, this can be written as
xadv0 = x (5)
xadvt+1 = clip(x
adv
t + α · sign(∇xadvt L(f(xadvt ; θ), y)), ǫ)
The clip(a, ǫ) function makes sure that each element ai
of a is in the range [ai − ǫ, ai + ǫ]. This ensures that the
max-norm constraint of each component of the perturbation
r, being no greater than ǫ is maintained. It thus corresponds
to projected gradient descent [63], with step-size α, into an
ℓ∞ ball of radius ǫ around the input x.
Iterative FGSM ll [55]. This is a stronger version of
FGSM ll. This attack sets the target to be the least likely
class predicted by the network, yll, in each iteration
xadvt+1 = clip(x
adv
t − α · sign(∇xadvt L(f(xadvt ; θ), yll)), ǫ).
(6)
The aforementioned attacks were all proposed in the
context of image classification, but they have been adapted
to the problems of semantic segmentation [35, 23], object
detection [87] and visual question answering [89]. Similar,
gradient-based attacks have also been proposed to minimise
the ℓ2 norm of the adversarial perturbation, r, [67, 18], and
also to attack other classification algorithms such as SVMs
[10]. Methods to optimise the non-differentiable ℓ0 norm of
the perturbation have also been proposed [82, 72, 69].
3. Adversarial Defenses and Evaluations
Liu et al. [59] have thoroughly evaluated the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples generated on one network
and tested on another unknown model, i.e. only as “black-
box” attacks [83, 71, 65, 66]. Kurakin et al. [55], contrast-
ingly, studied the adversarial training defense, which gen-
erates adversarial examples online and adds them into the
training set [38, 63, 84]. They found that training with ad-
versarial examples generated by single-step methods con-
ferred robustness to other single-step attacks with negligi-
ble performance difference to normally trained networks on
clean inputs. However, the adversarially trained network
was still as vulnerable to iterative attacks as standard mod-
els. Madry et al. [63], conversely, found robustness to it-
erative attacks by adversarial training with them. How-
ever, this was only on the small MNIST dataset. The de-
fense was not effective on CIFAR-10, underlining the im-
portance of testing on multiple datasets. Tramer et al. [84]
also found that adversarially trained models were still sus-
ceptible to black-box, single-step attacks generated from
other networks. Other adversarial defenses based on de-
tecting the perturbation in the input [64, 39, 34, 88, 81]
or pre-processing the input [41, 56, 86, 76] have also all
been subverted [5, 4, 17, 44, 16, 85]. Recently, progress
has been made on formal verification of neural networks
[49, 14] which can provably compute whether adversarial
examples with a particular norm exist for a network. How-
ever, as these methods are limited to certain architectures,
norms which are linear, and do not scale to large networks,
they cannot be used on the state-of-the-art networks we con-
sider in this work.
Currently, no effective defense to all adversarial attacks
exist. This motivates us, for the first time to our knowledge,
to study the properties of state-of-the-art segmentation net-
works and how they affect robustness to various adversarial
attacks. Previous evaluations have only considered standard
classification networks (Inception in [55], and GoogleNet,
VGG and ResNet in [59]). We consider the more com-
plex task of semantic segmentation, and evaluate eight dif-
ferent architectures, some of them with multiple classifica-
tion backbones, and show that some features of semantic
segmentation models (such as CRFs and multi-scale pro-
cessing) naturally implement recently proposed adversarial
defenses. Moreover, our evaluation is carried out on two
large-scale datasets instead of only ImageNet as [55, 59].
This allows us to show that not all previously observed em-
pirical results on classification transfer to segmentation.
The conclusions from our evaluations may thus aid fu-
ture efforts to develop defenses to adversarial attacks that
preserve predictive accuracy. Moreover, our results sug-
gests which state-of-the-art models for semantic segmen-
tation should currently be preferred in (safety-critical) set-
tings where both accuracy and robustness are a priority.
4. Experimental Set-up
We describe the datasets, DNN models, adversarial at-
tacks and evaluation metrics used for our evaluation in this
section. Exhaustive details are included in the supplemen-
tary. We have also released our code1 to aid reproducibility.
Datasets. We use the Pascal VOC [31] and Cityscapes
[25] validation sets, the two most widely used semantic seg-
mentation benchmarks. Pascal VOC consists of internet-
images labelled with 21 different classes. The reduced
validation [93, 60] set contains 346 images, and the train-
ing set has about 70000 images when combined with addi-
tional annotations from [42] and [58]. Cityscapes consists
of road-scenes captured from car-mounted cameras and has
19 classes. The validation set has 500 images, and the train-
ing set totals about 23000 images. As this dataset provides
high-resolution imagery (2048×1024 pixels) which require
too much memory for some models, we have resized all im-
ages to 1024× 512 when evaluating.
Models. We use a wide variety of current or previous
state-of-the-art models, ranging from lightweight networks
suitable for embedded applications to complex models
which explicitly enforce structural constraints. Whenever
possible, we have used publicly available code or trained
models. The models we had to retrain achieve similar per-
formance to the ones trained by the original authors.
We used the public models of CRF-RNN [93], Dilated-
Net [90], PSPNet [92] on Cityscapes, ICNet [92] and Seg-
Net [7]. We retrained FCN [60] and E-Net [74], as well as
Deeplab v2 [22] and PSPNet for VOC as the public models
are trained with the validation set. Our selection of net-
works are based on both VGG [80] and ResNet [43] back-
bones, whilst E-Net and ICNet employ custom architec-
tures for real-time applications whose parameters measure
only 1.5MB and 30.1MB in 32-bit floats, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the models we evaluate use a variety of unique
approaches including dilated convolutions [90, 22], skip-
connections [60], specialised pooling [92, 22], encoder-
1www.robots.ox.ac.uk/˜aarnab/adversarial_
robustness.html
decoder architecture [7, 74], multiscale processing [22] and
CRFs [93]. In all our experiments, we evaluate the model
in the same manner it was trained – CRF post-processing
or multiscale ensembling is not performed unless the net-
work incorporated CRFs [93] or multiscale averaging [22]
as network layers whilst training.
Adversarial attacks. We use the FGSM, FGSM ll, It-
erative FGSM and Iterative FGSM ll attacks described in
Sec. 2. Following [55], we set the number of iterations
of iterative attacks to min(ǫ + 4, ⌈1.25ǫ⌉) and step-size
α = 1 meaning that the value of each pixel is changed
by 1 every iteration. The Iterative FGSM (untargeted) and
FGSM ll (targeted) attacks are only reported in the sup-
plementary as we observed similar trends on FGSM and
Iterative FGSM ll. We evaluated these attacks when set-
ting the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbations ǫ to each value from
{0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32}. Even small values such as
ǫ = 0.25 introduce errors among all the models we eval-
uated. The maximum value of ǫ was chosen as 32 since the
perturbation is conspicuous at this point. Qualitative exam-
ples of these attacks are shown in the supplementary.
Evaluation metric. The Intersection over Union (IoU) is
the primary metric used in evaluating semantic segmenta-
tion [31, 25]. However, as the accuracy of each model
varies, we adapt the relative metric used by [55] for image
classification and measure adversarial robustness using the
IoU Ratio – the ratio of the network’s IoU on adversarial
examples to that on clean images computed over the entire
dataset. As the relative ranking between models for the IoU
Ratio and absolute IoU is typically the same, we report the
latter only in the supplementary.
5. The robustness of different architectures
We evaluate the robustness of different architectures and
show how our observations regarding model capacity and
single-step attacks do not corroborate with some previous
findings in the context of image classification [55, 63]. Ad-
ditionally, our results also support why JPEG compression
as a pre-processing step mitigates small perturbations [29].
5.1. The robustness of different networks
Fig. 2 shows the robustness of several state-of-the-art
models on the VOC dataset. In general, ResNet-based mod-
els not only achieve higher accuracy on clean inputs but are
also more robust to adversarial inputs. This is particularly
the case for the single-step FGSM attack (Fig. 2a). On the
more effective Iterative FGSM ll attack, the margin between
the most and least robust network is smaller as none of them
perform well (Fig. 2b). However, we note that iterative at-
tacks tend not to transfer to other models [55] (Sec. 6.2).
(a) Untargeted FGSM attack (b) Targeted Iterative FGSM ll. attack
Figure 2: Adversarial robustness of state-of-the-art models on Pascal VOC. Models based on the ResNet backbone tend to be
more robust. For instance, FCN8s and Deeplab v2 ASPP with a ResNet-101 backbone are more robust than with the VGG
backbone. Moreover, as expected, the Iterative FGSM ll attack is more powerful at fooling networks than single-step FGSM.
Models are ordered by increasing IoU on clean inputs. Results on additional attacks are in the supplementary.
Thus, they are less useful in practical, black-box attacks.
In particular, we have evaluated the FCN8s [60] and
Deeplab-v2 with ASPP [22] models based on the popu-
lar VGG-16 [80] and ResNet-101 [43] backbones. In both
cases, the ResNet variant shows greater robustness. We also
observe that most of the networks achieve similar scores on
clean inputs. As a result, the relative rankings of models in
Fig. 2 for the IoU Ratio is about the same as their ranking
on clean inputs. Furthermore, the best performing model
on clean inputs, PSPNet [92] is actually less robust than
Deeplab v2 with Multiscale ASPP [22]: For all ǫ values we
tested, the absolute IoU score of Deeplab v2 was higher than
PSPNet. These observations as well as results on FGSM ll
and Iterative FGSM showing that the relative ranking of ro-
bustness for the different networks is similar, are detailed in
the supplementary material.
5.2. Model capacity and residual connections
Madry et al. [63] and Kurakin et al. [55] have studied
the effect of model capacity on adversarial robustness by
changing the number of filters at each DNN layer, since
they used the parameter count as a proxy for model ca-
pacity. Madry et al. [63] observed on MNIST and CIFAR-
10, that networks, trained on clean examples, with a small
number of parameters are the most vulnerable to adversarial
examples. This observation would have serious safety im-
plications on deployment of lightweight models, typically
required by embedded platforms. Instead, we analyse dif-
ferent network structures and show in Fig. 3 that lightweight
networks such as E-Net [74] (only 1.5 MB) and IC-Net [91]
(only 30.1 MB) are affected by adversarial examples simi-
larly as Dilated-Net [90] which has 512.6 MB in parameters
(using 32-bit floats). Dilated-Net is only more robust than
both of these lightweight networks for FGSM and FGSM-ll
with ǫ ≥ 4 (which is also when perturbations become visi-
ble to the naked eye). Note that both E-Net and IC-Net have
custom backbones and heavily use residual connections.
Fig. 3 also shows that adding the “Context” module of
Dilated-Net onto the “Front-end” slightly reduces robust-
ness across all ǫ values on both attacks on Cityscapes. Fig. 2
shows that this is observed for most ǫ values on VOC as
well. This is even though the additional parameters of
the “Context” module increases accuracy on clean inputs.
Whilst models with higher capacity may be more resistant
to adversarial attacks, one cannot compare the capacities
of different networks, given that neither the most accurate
network (PSPNet) or the network with the most parameters
(Dilated-Net) are actually the most robust.
5.3. The unexpected effectiveness of single-step
methods on Cityscapes
The single-step FGSM and FGSM ll attacks are signif-
icantly more effective on Cityscapes than on Pascal VOC.
The IoU ratio for FGSM at ǫ = 32 for PSPNet and Dilated
Context is 2.5% and 2.8%, respectively, on Cityscapes. On
Pascal VOC, it is substantially higher at 27.9% and 12.2%.
Single-step methods (which only search in a 1-D subspace
in the space of images) also appear to outperform iterative
methods for high ǫ values on Cityscapes. In contrast, iter-
ative attacks appear about as effective on Cityscapes as on
Pascal VOC, when using the same hyperparameters as [55].
Thus, it may be a dataset property that causes the net-
work to learn weights more susceptible to single-step at-
tacks. Cityscapes has, subjectively, less variability than
VOC and it also labels “stuff” classes [36]. The effect of
the training set on adversarial attacks has not been consid-
ered before, and most prior work used MNIST [83, 38, 63]
or ImageNet [55, 84, 59]. However, [11] and [51], showed
(a) Untargeted FGSM attack (b) Targeted Iterative FGSM ll. attack
Figure 3: Adversarial robustness of state-of-the-art models on the Cityscapes dataset. Contrary to Madry et al. [63], we
observe that lightweight networks such as E-Net [74] and ICNet [91] are often about as robust as Dilated-Net [90] (341×
more parameters than E-Net). Dilated-Net without its “Context” module is slightly more robust than the full network. As
with the VOC dataset, ResNet (PSPNet) architectures are more robust than VGG (Dilated-Net and FCN8). Curiously, the
FGSM attack is more effective than Iterative FGSM ll which computes adversarial examples from a larger search space.
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Figure 4: The IoU Ratio compared to the IoU on clean in-
puts on the Pascal VOC dataset, for the FGSM attack with
ǫ = 8. The relative ordering of the models is the same if we
plot the absolute IoU on adversarial inputs, with the excep-
tion of SegNet which is then ranked the lowest.
that the test error of an SVM and neural network could re-
spectively be increased by inserting “poisonous” examples
into its training set. Results from the FGSM ll attack, which
shows the same trend as FGSM, are in the supplementary.
5.4. Imperceptible perturbations
With ǫ = 0.25, the perturbation is so small that the RGB
values of the image pixels (assuming integers ∈ [0, 255])
are usually unchanged. Nevertheless, Fig. 2 and 3 show
that the performance of all analysed models were degraded
by at least 9% relative IoU for each attack. The observation
of [29], that lossy JPEG as a pre-processing step helps to
mitigate FGSM for small ǫ is thus not surprising as JPEG
does not entirely preserve these small, high-frequency per-
turbations and the result is also finally rounded to integers.
5.5. Relation with concurrent work
Our results are also corroborated by the concurrent work
of Cubuk et al. [26] who performed Neural Architecture
Search to find architectures that are more robust to adver-
sarial examples. Cubuk et al. [26] found that their best
architecture had more identity connections and depth than
their baseline. This agrees with our observation that mod-
els based on ResNet typically have higher robustness and
accuracy on clean inputs.
The authors also observed a correlation between accu-
racy on clean data and robustness. We also observed this
correlation (Fig. 4), although the most accurate model on
clean inputs (PSPNet) is not the most robust (Deeplab v2
Multiscale). Figure 4 shows the results on the FGSM attack
at ǫ = 8, for consistency with [26].
5.6. Discussion
We have shown that models with residual connections
(ResNet, E-Net, ICNet) are inherently more robust than
chain-like VGG-based networks, even if the number of pa-
rameters of the VGG model is orders of magnitude larger.
Moreover, Dilated-Net, without its “Context” module is
more robust than its more performant, full version. This
is contrary to the observations regarding parameter count of
[63] and [55] who simply increased the number of filters at
each layer. The most robust model was Deeplab v2 with
Multiscale ASPP, outperforming the current state-of-the-art
PSPNet [92], in absolute IoU on adversarial inputs.
We also found that perturbations that do not even change
the image’s integral RGB values still degraded performance
of all models, and that single-step attacks are significantly
more effective on Cityscapes than VOC, achieving as low as
0.8% relative IoU. This was unexpected, given that single-
step methods only search in a one-dimensional subspace,
and raises questions about how the training data of a net-
work affects its decision boundaries. Also, explaining the
effect of residual connections on adversarial robustness re-
mains an open research question. As Deeplab v2 showed a
significant increase in robustness over its single-scale vari-
ant, we analyse the effects of multiscale processing next in
Sec. 6. Thereafter, we study CRFs, a common component
in semantic segmentation models.
6. Multiscale Processing and Transferability of
Adversarial Examples
Deeplab v2 with Multiscale ASPP was the most robust
model to various attacks in Sec. 5, with a significant dif-
ference to its single-scale variant. In this section, we first
examine the effect of multiscale processing and then relate
our observations to concurrent work.
6.1. Multiscale processing
The Deeplab v2 network processes images at three dif-
ferent resolutions, 50%, 75% and 100% where the weights
are shared among each of the scale branches. The results
from each scale are upsampled to a common resolution,
and then max-pooled such that the most confident predic-
tion at each pixel from each of the scale branches is chosen
[22]. This network is trained in this multiscale manner, al-
though it is possible to perform this multiscale ensembling
as a post-processing step at test-time only [21, 27, 57, 92].
We hypothesise that adversarial attacks, when generated
at a single scale, are no longer as malignant when processed
at another. This is because CNNs are not invariant to scale,
and a range of other transformations [33, 75, 45]. And al-
though it is possible to generate adversarial attacks from
multiple different scales of the input, these examples may
not be as effective at a single scale, making networks which
process images at multiple scales more robust. We inves-
tigate the transferability of adversarial perturbations gener-
ated at one scale and evaluated at another in Sec. 6.2, and
the robustness and transferability of multiscale networks in
Sec. 6.3. Thereafter, we relate our findings to concurrent
work.
6.2. The transferability of adversarial examples at
different scales
Table 1 shows results for the FGSM and Iterative FGSM
ll attacks. The diagonals show “white-box” attacks where
the adversarial examples are generated from the attacked
network. These attacks typically result in the greatest per-
formance degradation, as expected. The off-diagonals show
the transferability of perturbations generated from other net-
works. In constrast to Iterative FGSM ll, FGSM attacks
transfer well to other networks, which confirms the obser-
vations [55] made in the context of image classification.
The attack produced from 50% resolution inputs trans-
fers poorly to other scales of Deeplab v2 and other archi-
tectures, and vice versa. This is seen by looking across the
columns and rows of Tab. 1 respectively. All other mod-
els, FCN (VGG and ResNet) and Deeplab v2 VGG were
trained at 100% resolution, and Tab. 1 shows that perturba-
tions generated from the multiscale and 100% resolutions of
Deeplab v2 transfer the best. This supports the hypothesis
that adversarial attacks produced at one scale are not as ef-
fective when evaluated at another since CNNs are not scale
invariant (the network activations change considerably).
6.3. Multiscale networks and adversarial examples
The multiscale version of Deeplab v2 is the most robust
to white-box attacks (Tab. 1, Fig. 2) as well as perturbations
generated from single-scale networks. Moreover, attacks
produced from it transfer the best to other networks as well,
as shown by the bolded entries. This is probably because at-
tacks generated from this model are produced from multiple
input resolutions simultaneously. For the Iterative FGSM ll
attack, only the perturbations from the multiscale version of
Deeplab v2 transfer well to other networks, achieving a sim-
ilar IoU ratio as a white-box attack. However, this is only
the case when attacking a different scale of Deeplab. Whilst
perturbations from multiscale Deeplab v2 transfer better on
FCN than from single-scale inputs, they are still far from
the efficacy of a white-box attack (which has an IoU ratio
of 15.2% on FCN-VGG and 26.4% on FCN-ResNet).
Adversarial perturbations generated from multiscale in-
puts to FCN8 (which has only been trained at a single
scale) behave in a similar way: FCN8 with multiscale in-
puts is more robust to white-box attacks, and its perturba-
tions transfer better to other networks. This suggests that
the observations seen in Tab. 1 are not properties of training
the network, but rather the fact that CNNs are not scale in-
variant. Furthermore, an alternative to max-pooling the pre-
dictions at each scale is to average them. Average-pooling
produces similar results to max-pooling. Details of these
experiments, along with results using different attacks and
l∞ norms (ǫ values), are presented in the supplementary.
6.4. Relation to other defenses
Our observations relate to the “random resizing” defense
of [86] in concurrent work. Here, the input image is ran-
domly resized and then classified. This defense exploits
(but does not attribute its efficacy to) the fact that CNNs are
not scale invariant and that adversarial examples were only
generated at the original scale. Our findings suggest that
this defense (which is very similar to the multiscale process-
ing performed naturally by Deeplab v2) could be defeated
by creating adversarial attacks frommultiple scales, as done
in this work, and this has indeed been verified [5, 85].
Table 1: Transferability of adversarial examples generated from different scales of Deeplab v2 (columns) and evaluated on
different networks (rows). The underlined diagonals for each attack show white-box attacks. Off-diagonals, show transfer
(black-box) attacks. The most effective one in bold, is typically from the multiscale version of Deeplab v2. The IoU ratio is
reported.
Network evaluated
FGSM (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM ll (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
Deeplab v2 50% scale (ResNet) 37.3 70.5 84.8 60.3 18.0 92.0 96.9 20.0
Deeplab v2 75% scale (ResNet) 85.5 39.7 62.2 50.8 99.5 17.9 89.9 20.4
Deeplab v2 100% scale (ResNet) 93.6 57.9 37.7 37.2 100.0 79.0 15.5 16.8
Deeplab v2 Multiscale (ResNet) 83.7 57.6 62.3 53.1 99.6 90.2 91.9 21.5
Deeplab v2 100% scale (VGG) 94.3 70.6 66.9 66.5 98.9 88.4 86.3 80.9
FCN8 (VGG) 94.7 67.2 65.8 65.4 98.4 85.2 84.9 78.5
FCN8 (ResNet) 94.0 66.3 63.5 63.1 99.4 82.6 80.3 74.1
7. Image transformations and adversarial ex-
amples
In Sec. 6, we posited that adversarial examples are less
malicious when processed at different scales since CNNs
are not scale invariant. Scale changes are used in segmen-
tation architectures to recognise objects at different resolu-
tions, however, this is not the only commonly used image
transformation. In this section, we consider a number of
other common input transformations, and examine their ef-
fect on adversarial robustness of CNNs for semantic seg-
mentation.
In the following, each transformation is applied to the
input image before it is processed by the neural network
and we examine how it affects the robustness to adversarial
examples. Following on from Sec. 6, we use the Deeplab
v2 MS network, which we found to be the most robust in
Sec. 5, and consider the following four transformations (il-
lustrated in Fig. 5) which are ubiquitous in computer vision
and image processing:
JPEG recompression. The image is compressed using
JPEG with a “quality” parameter drawn randomly between
50% and 100%. The image is then reconstructed and pro-
cessed by the network.
Gaussian blur. The input image is blurred by a Gaussian
filter with a bandwidth uniformly drawn from [0, 2], which
ensures that all objects in the image are still recognisable
and can be segmented precisely.
HSV jitter. The image is converted to the HSV colour
space (which is more perceptually similar than the RGB
space). Next, each pixel is perturbed by a value drawn uni-
formly between [−30, 30] and then converted back to RGB
space for processing.
Grayscale. The input image is converted to grayscale
by setting all three image channels to have the same value
at each pixel. This was performed using a convex combi-
nation of each of the three RGB channels, with each of the
co-efficients sampled from a flat Dirichlet distribution.
Note that none of the transformations affect the image
spatial co-ordinates, which means that it is suitable for us-
ing with semantic segmentation models without any addi-
tional post-processing. These transformations, though quite
disparate, all have a similar effect on adversarial robustness
as described in the next subsection.
7.1. Robustness conferred by randomised input
transformations
Figure 6 shows that each type of input transformation
substantially increases the robustness of Deeplab v2 to the
Iterative FGSM ll attack on the VOC dataset, with “JPEG
recompression” and “Gaussian blur” providing substantial
benefits. Converting the image to grayscale with random
channel coefficients provides a smaller, but still sizeable,
improvement. These findings are consistent and show little
variance over 9 different trials, since each input transforma-
tion is randomised. The IoU of the transformed images at
ǫ = 0 (i.e. corresponding to no attack) is similar to the orig-
inal image with the largest difference about 2%. Therefore,
the network is more sensitive to input transformations on
adversarial images than it is on clean ones.
These results, in addition to Tab. 6, show that as neural
networks are not invariant to many classes of transforma-
tions of the input, their predictions on adversarial examples
subject to these transformations change. Consequently, pre-
dictions on transformed adversarial inputs are different to
the original adversarial example, and this typically results
in the adversarial example becoming less malignant. These
findings are consistent across a broad range of geometric
and photometric transformations.
Dziugaite et al. [29] previously observed that JPEG re-
compression improved adversarial robustness for small ǫ
values in the context of image classification. However, the
authors hypothesised that a special property of the JPEG
algorithm (i.e. mapping images back onto the manifold of
natural images) was the reason it conferred additional ro-
Transformation None ( = 0) None ( = 8) JPEG
recompression
Gaussian blur HSV jitter Stochastic
grayscale
Input
Prediction
Figure 5: Input transformations of adversarial examples generated by Iterative FGSM ll (Eq. 6) significantly change the
prediction of the Deeplab v2 network. These input transformations, however, barely change the output when they are applied
to clean images. The l∞ norm of the perturbation,  = 8, is visible when looking carefully on screen.
Figure 6: The adversarial examples originally generated
by Iterative FGSM ll on Deeplab v2, are less malignant
when the adversarial image is first pre-processed with a ran-
domised transformation. The shaded regions correspond to
two standard deviations computed from nine random trials
of the randomised transformation.
bustness. In contrast, our study of various different trans-
formations suggest that JPEG recompression is just one in-
stance of the numerous input transformations which neural
networks are not invariant to. As a result, JPEG recom-
pression, along with other image transformations, increases
robustness to adversarial examples that were generated by
attacks which did not take it into account.
7.2. Subverting randomised, non-differentiable in-
put transformations
The results shown in Fig. 6 suggest that randomised
input transformations serve as an effective defense to ad-
versarial attacks. They significantly reduced the effective-
ness of the Iterative FGSM ll attack, which has been the
most powerful attack in our experiments, and the result for
 = 0 also shows that this method has minimal performance
penalties on clean inputs. This reasoning has been exploited
by the concurrent work of [41], where the authors showed
how several different input transformations increased the
robustness of image classification models to adversarial at-
tacks.
However, the results in Fig. 6 and [41] assume that
knowledge of the defence mechanism (randomised input
transformations in this case) is not exploited in generating
the adversarial attack. This methodology goes against Ker-
ckhoffs’ principle [50] – the basis of modern cryptographic
systems – which states that a system should be secure if ev-
erything about it barring the key is public knowledge.
Consequently, to confirm if randomised input transfor-
mations really confer adversarial robustness, we modify
the Iterative FGSM ll update (Eq. 6) to compute the ex-
pected gradient over the distribution of transformations
which could be applied at inference time,
xadvt+1 = clip
(
xadvt − α · sign(Et∼T∇xadvt L(f(t(xadvt ); θ), yll), )
)
,
(7)
where T is the distribution of transformation functions
t. This method uses the fact that ∇xEt∼T f(t(x)) =
Et∼T∇xf(t(x)) . It has also been used by a concurrent
work [5] to estimate the gradient of neural networks with
randomised non-differentiable adversarial defences [86].
This variant of the FGSM attack corresponds to sampling
from the distribution of transformations, computing the loss
and gradient of the image with respect to the loss, and av-
eraging this gradient over many samples before performing
the update.
Note that some transformations, such as JPEG recom-
pression, are not differentiable. In this case, we use the
straight-through estimator [9] which assumes, when com-
puting the gradient using backpropagation, that the trans-
formation is the identity function.
Figure 7 shows the results of the Expectation over Trans-
formations (EOT) attack (Eq. 7) on the Deeplab v2 model
on the Pascal VOC dataset, with the expectation computed
over 10 samples. The randomised JPEG and Gaussian blur
input transformations increase the robustness of the model
marginally, whilst jittering pixel values in the HSV space
and grayscale conversion provide no additional robustness.
Figure 7: The randomised input transformations no longer
increase the robustness of the network when the expected
gradient over the distribution of the transformation func-
tions is used in the Iterative FGSM ll attack. The shaded re-
gions correspond to two standard deviations computed from
nine random trials of the randomised transformation. The
dashed blue line shows the original Iterative FGSM ll at-
tack on non-transformed images.
The final IoU is similar to the original model that did not use
randomised input transformations and was attacked with the
standard Iterative FGSM ll attack. To our knowledge, we
are the first who show that neural networks can easily be
attacked with both non-differentiable and randomised in-
put transformations. However, we point out that [5] have
attacked numerous recent defenses, some which were non-
differentiable or randomised, but not both.
7.3. Transferability of input transformations
The previous two parts have shown that using input
transformations reduces the malignancy of an adversarial
perturbation (Sec. 7). Our second observation however
showed that whenever we exploit knowledge about the in-
put transformation during attack generation, the perturba-
tion can become as malignant as the attack on the image
with no input transformation (Sec. 7.2).
In this section, we examine the transferability of the per-
turbations generated from different transformations as de-
scribed in Sec. 7.2. For example, we consider the efficacy
of a perturbation created using the “JPEG recompression”
transformation when the network’s input is pre-processed
with “Gaussian blur” instead. This has important impli-
cations on the robustness and security of neural networks;
if the perturbations do not transfer across different input
transformations, it would suggest that a “security-through-
obscurity” approach could be used, as a defender could se-
cure their system by ensuring that the attacker does not
know the input transformations they are using It also has
implications on our ability to produce malicious physical
adversarial examples [54, 77], as physical objects in the real
world can be viewed from a diverse range of illumination
conditions, camera viewpoints and other transformations of
an original canonical view.
Table 2 and Fig. 8 show our results when the adversar-
ial perturbation generated using one distribution of transfor-
mations is applied on a network using another randomised
transformation as pre-processing. Table 2 shows the abso-
lute IoU (to account for the fact that input transformations
cause slight changes on the accuracy of clean inputs) for
 = 8, which is when the adversarial perturbations be-
come conspicuous to the human eye, whilst Fig. 8 sum-
marises the results for all  values. Perturbations gener-
ated to target “JPEG recompression” or “Gaussian blur” in-
put pre-processing (the two transformations which confer
the most robustness to standard attacks generated without
transformations (Fig. 6)), show poor transferability when
the “Grayscale” or “HSV jitter” input transformation is used
instead. In contrast, perturbations generated to target the
“Grayscale” input transformation transfer the best to the
other input transformations that we have considered in our
experiments. Additionally, the last row of Tab. 2 shows that
when no input transformation is used at inference time, at-
tacks generated to target a particular input transformation
are more effective with the exception of the “Grayscale”
transformation. This corresponds with our results in Sec. 6
where adversarial attacks generated at multiple scales trans-
ferred better to other models.
There are clearly a myriad of input transformations that
could be performed as input pre-processing to a neural net-
work, of which we have considered only a handful. Nev-
ertheless, it is evident that targeting some input transfor-
mations (such as grayscale conversion) appears to produce
perturbations that are more transferable to other input trans-
formations in comparison to others (JPEG recompression).
This raises an important research question about why in-
cluding certain input transformations into the attack genera-
tion process transfer better to other input transformations. It
also suggests another critical and open question, whether it
is possible to produce adversarial perturbations that are ma-
lignant across all input transformations without modelling
all of these transformations explicitly when generating the
attack.
7.4. Relation to concurrent work
Our findings corroborate with concurrent work dis-
cussing producing physical adversarial attacks. Lu et al.
[61] created adversarial traffic signs by capturing images of
road signs from 0.5m and 1.5m away, generating attacks
from these images on a computer, and then printing out
the adversarial image onto paper. Whilst the printed image
taken from 0.5m away fooled an object detector viewing
the adversarial image from 0.5m, it did not when viewed
from 1.5m and vice versa. This result is corroborated
by Tab. 1 which shows that adversarial examples transfer
(a) JPEG recompression (b) Gaussian blur (c) HSV jitter (d) Stochastic grayscale
Figure 8: The effectiveness of adversarial examples generated with one distribution of input transformations, and evaluated
with another. The title of each graph shows the input transformation the adversarial examples were generated with. Each
graph is effectively a column of Tab. 2 for multiple  values. The dotted blue line shows the Iterative FGSM ll attack when
input transformations are not used at either inference or attack generation time.
Table 2: Transferability of adversarial attacks generated with different input transformation distributions. The left column
indicates the distribution of transformations (as described in Sec. 7) that was used at inference time, and the other columns
show the input transformations used when generating the attack. This table shows the mean absolute IoU scores of the
Deeplab v2 network on the VOC dataset for the Iterative FGSM ll attack with  = 8. The diagonals show “white-box” entries
where the input transformation distribution used at inference time is used to generate the attack as well. The bold entries off
the diagonals show the strongest attack when a different transformation distribution is used at inference time.
Input transformation to generate attackInput transformation
at
inference time
JPEG
recompression Gaussian blur HSV jittering
Stochastic
grayscale None
JPEG recompression 19.7 30.9 17.2 17.4 47.7
Gaussian blur 31.6 18.4 21.3 22.4 43.5
HSV jitter 39.9 39.2 15.7 16.3 33.5
Stochastic grayscale 50.0 49.3 32.0 13.6 25.2
None 11.6 14.4 12.0 24.4 15.5
poorly across different scales. Subsequent work [6, 32]
has shown that it is possible to construct adversarial exam-
ples that are malignant across multiple different scales by
incorporating scale changes into the attack generation pro-
cess. This is again supported by our results in Tab. 1, and
Sec. 7.2 which also show this effect for a number of other
input transformations. When producing physical adversar-
ial attacks, it is difficult to model all the transformations that
the original image could be subject to, and as reflected by
Sec. 7.3, adversarial examples generated to target a particu-
lar transformation do not always transfer well to other input
transformations. This may explain why the adversarial traf-
fic signs generated by [32] have not been able to fool the
detectors subsequently evaluated by Lu et al. [62]. Our ob-
servation that input transformations that were not explicitly
modelled in the attack generation process mitigate the effec-
tiveness of adversarial attacks also suggest that future work
on physical adversarial attacks requires much more robust
evaluation than initial work in this area [54, 32, 61, 12].
This is to ascertain whether the proposed attacks are still ef-
fective in the diverse environmental conditions that images
of the adversarial object may be acquired from.
Our study of the effect of input transformations on ad-
versarial robustness also emphasises the importance of in-
corporating knowledge of the proposed adversarial defence
into the attack used to validate it (Kerckhoff’s principle
[50]). This is not the case for many recently proposed de-
fenses [41, 86, 13, 56] which have all subsequently been
defeated [17, 5, 85, 4].
8. Effect of CRFs on Adversarial Robustness
Conditional Random Fields (CRFs) are commonly used
in semantic segmentation to enforce structural constraints
[3]. The most common formulation is DenseCRF [52],
which encourages nearby (in terms of position or appear-
ance) pixels to take on the same label and hence prefers
smooth labelling. This is done by a pairwise potential func-
tion, defined between each pair of pixels, which takes the
form of a weighted sum of a bilateral and Gaussian filter.
Intuitively, one may observe that adversarial perturba-
tions typically appear as a high-frequency noise, and thus
the pairwise terms of DenseCRF which act as a low-pass
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: (a) On untargetted attacks on Pascal VOC, CRF-RNN is noticably more robust than FCN8s. (b) CRF-RNN is
more vulnerable to black-box attacks from FCN8, due to its “gradient masking” effect which results in ineffective white-box
attacks. (c) However, the CRF does not “mask” the gradient for targeted attacks and it is no more robust than FCN8s.
filter, may provide resistance to adversarial examples. To
verify this hypothesis, we consider CRF-RNN [93]. This
approach formulates mean-field inference of DenseCRF as
an RNN which is appended to the FCN8s network [60], en-
abling end-to-end training.
8.1. CRFs confer robustness to untargeted attacks
Fig. 9a shows that CRF-RNN is markedly more robust
than FCN8s to the untargeted FGSM and Iterative FGSM
attacks. To verify the hypothesis that the smoothing effect
of the pairwise terms increases the robustness to adversarial
attacks, we evaluated various values of the bandwidth hy-
perparameters defining the pairwise potentials (not learned;
in Fig. 9a, we used the values of the public model).
Higher bandwidth values (increasing smoothness) do not
actually lead to greater robustness. Instead, we observed a
correlation between the final confidence of the predictions
(from different hyperparameter settings) and robustness to
adversarial examples. We measured confidence according
to the probability of the highest-scoring label at each pixel,
as well as the entropy of the marginal distribution over all
labels at each pixel. The mean confidence and entropy for
CRF-RNN (with original hyperparameters) is 99.1% and
0.025 nats respectively, whilst it is 95.2% and 0.13 nats for
FCN8s (additional details in supplementary). The fact that
mean-field inference tends to produce overconfident predic-
tions has also been noted previously by [68] and [15].
More confident predictions lead to a smaller loss, making
attacks which use the gradient of the loss with respect to the
input less effective. The “Defensive Distillation” approach
of [73] made use of a similar fact by increasing the confi-
dence of the model’s predictions, resulting in gradients of
smaller norm. The key difference is that CRFs increase the
confidence as a by-product of a technique generally used to
improve accuracy on numerous pixel-wise labelling tasks,
while the effect of [73] on accuracy is unknown, as it was
only tested on the saturated MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
8.2. Circumventing the CRF
Although CRFs are more resistant to untargeted attacks,
they can still be subverted in two ways. CRF-RNN is effec-
tively FCN8s with an appended mean-field layer. Fig. 9b
shows, that adversarial examples generated via FGSM from
FCN8s (“unary” potentials) are more effective on CRF-
RNN than attacks from the output layer of CRF-RNN.
Also, targeted attacks with FGSM ll and Iterative FGSM
ll are more effective since the label used to compute the loss
for generating the adversarial example is not the network’s
(highly confident) prediction but rather the least likely label.
Consequently, the loss is high and there is a strong gradi-
ent signal from which to compute the adversarial example.
Fig. 9c shows that CRF-RNN and FCN8s barely differ in
their adversarial robustness to targeted attacks.
Finally, Fig. 10 shows that the same observations hold
on the DeepLab v2 network, where the DenseCRF model
is used as post-processing, and is not part of the neural net-
work. This confirms that end-to-end training of the CRF,
as done in CRF-RNN [93], does not influence adversarial
robustness.
8.3. Discussion
The smoothing effect of CRFs, perhaps counter-
intuitively, has no impact on the adversarial robustness of
a DNN. However, mean-field inference produces confident
marginals, making untargeted attacks less effective since
they rely on the gradient of the final loss with respect to the
prediction. Black-box attacks generated from models with-
out a CRF transfer well to networks with a CRF, and are ac-
tually more effective. This is the case for both CRFs trained
end-to-end [93] and used as post-processing [22], as shown
in the supplementary. Finally, CRFs confer no robustness
to untargeted attacks. Our investigation of the CRF also
underlines the importance of testing thoroughly with black-
box attacks and multiple attack algorithms, which is not the
case for numerous proposed defenses [24, 37, 38, 73].
9. Conclusion
We have presented what to our knowledge is the first rig-
orous evaluation of the robustness of semantic segmentation
models to adversarial attacks. We believe our main observa-
tions will facilitate future efforts to understand and defend
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10: Similar trends are observed for Deeplab v2, which uses the DenseCRF model as post-processing, as CRF-RNN
(Fig. 9) which integrates the CRF as part of the deep network. (a) On untargetted attacks, Deeplab v2 with a CRF is noticably
more robust than just the Deeplab v2 network. (b) Attacks created from the base Deeplab v2 network using FGSM are more
effective than those created from Deeplab v2 with CRF. This is due to the “gradient masking” effect of mean-field inference
of CRFs. (c) However, the CRF does not “mask” the gradient for targeted attacks. As a result, Deeplab v2 with a CRF is no
more robust than just the Deeplab v2 network.
against these attacks without compromising accuracy:
Networks with residual connections are inherently more
robust than chain-like networks. This extends to the case of
models with very few parameters, contrary to the prior ob-
servations of [55, 63]. Multiscale processing makes CNNs
more robust since adversarial inputs are not as malignant
when processed at a different scale from which they were
generated at, probably as CNNs are not invariant to scale.
Using other input transformations that CNNs are not invari-
ant make them markedly more robust to transformed adver-
sarial examples but only when the attack generation does
not take knowledge of these input transformations into ac-
count. This holds even when the input transformations are
randomised, however, when this knowledge is taken into
account during attack generation, only marginal improve-
ments in robustness are observed. The fact that adversarial
attacks generated to target particular input transformation
do not always transfer well to other input transformations
also suggests that producing physical adversarial attacks in
varying environmental conditions is difficult.
Mean-field inference for Dense CRFs, which increases
the confidence of predictions confers robustness to untar-
geted attacks, as it naturally performs “gradient masking”
[71, 73]. There are no robustness benefits from the smooth-
ness priors enforced by the DenseCRF model.
In the shorter term, our observations suggest that net-
works such as Deeplab v2, which is based on ResNet
and performs multiscale processing, should be preferred in
safety-critical applications due to their inherent robustness.
As the most accurate network on clean inputs is not nec-
essarily the most robust network, we recommend evaluat-
ing robustness to a variety of adversarial attacks as done
in this paper to find the best combination of accuracy and
robustness before deploying models in practice. We also
emphasize that it is crucial to evaluate proposed defenses
judiciously, e.g. using the white-box attacks which exploit
knowledge of the proposed defense to assess the real effi-
cacy of such a defense.
Adversarial attacks are arguably the greatest challenge
affecting DNNs. The recent interest of our field into this
phenomenon is only the start of an important longer-term
effort, and we should also study the influence of other fac-
tors such as training regimes and attacks tailored to evalua-
tion metrics. In this paper, we have made numerous obser-
vations and raised questions that will aid future work in un-
derstanding adversarial examples and developing more ef-
fective defenses.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the EPSRC, Clarendon
Fund, ERC grant ERC-2012-AdG 321162-HELIOS, EP-
SRC grant Seebibyte EP/M013774/1 and EPSRC/MURI
grant EP/N019474/1.
References
[1] A. Arnab, S. Jayasumana, S. Zheng, and P. H. S. Torr. Higher
order conditional random fields in deep neural networks. In
ECCV, 2016. 1
[2] A. Arnab, O. Miksik, and P. H. Torr. On the robustness of se-
mantic segmentation models to adversarial attacks. In CVPR,
2018.
[3] A. Arnab, S. Zheng, S. Jayasumana, B. Romera-Paredes,
M. Larsson, A. Kirillov, B. Savchynskyy, C. Rother, F. Kahl,
and P. H. S. Torr. Conditional random fields meet deep neu-
ral networks for semantic segmentation: Combining prob-
abilistic graphical models with deep learning for structured
prediction. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 35(1):37–52,
Jan 2018. 11
[4] A. Athalye and N. Carlini. On the robustness of the cvpr
2018 white-box adversarial example defenses. In arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.03286, 2018. 3, 11
[5] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner. Obfuscated gradients
give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to ad-
versarial examples. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.00420v1,
2018. 3, 7, 9, 10, 11
[6] A. Athalye and I. Sutskever. Synthesizing robust adversarial
examples. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397v1, 2017. 11
[7] V. Badrinarayanan, A. Handa, and R. Cipolla. Segnet: A
deep convolutional encoder-decoder architecture for robust
semantic pixel-wise labelling. CoRR, abs/1505.07293, 2015.
4, 17, 18
[8] H. G. Barrow and J. Tenenbaum. Interpreting line drawings
as three-dimensional surfaces, 1981. 1
[9] Y. Bengio, N. Le´onard, and A. Courville. Estimating or prop-
agating gradients through stochastic neurons for conditional
computation. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1308.3432, 2013. 9
[10] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´,
P. Laskov, G. Giacinto, and F. Roli. Evasion attacks against
machine learning at test time. In Joint European conference
on machine learning and knowledge discovery in databases,
pages 387–402. Springer, 2013. 1, 2, 3
[11] B. Biggio, B. Nelson, and P. Laskov. Poisoning attacks
against support vector machines. In ICML, 2012. 5
[12] T. B. Brown, D. Mane´, A. Roy, M. Abadi, and J. Gilmer. Ad-
versarial patch. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.09665, 2017.
11
[13] J. Buckman, A. Roy, C. Raffel, and I. Goodfellow. Ther-
mometer encoding: One hot way to resist adversarial exam-
ples. In ICLR, 2018. 11
[14] R. Bunel, I. Turkaslan, P. H. Torr, P. Kohli, and M. P. Kumar.
Piecewise linear neural network verification: A comparative
study. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.00455, 2017. 3
[15] P. Carbonetto and N. D. Freitas. Conditional mean field. In
NIPS, 2007. 12
[16] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Defensive distillation is
not robust to adversarial examples. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.04311v1, 2016. 1, 3
[17] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Adversarial examples are not
easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In arXiv
preprint arXiv:1705.07263v1, 2017. 1, 3, 11
[18] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness
of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2017. 1, 3
[19] K. Chalupka, P. Perona, and F. Eberhardt. Visual causal fea-
ture learning. In UAI, 2015. 1
[20] S. Chandra and I. Kokkinos. Fast, exact and multi-scale in-
ference for semantic image segmentation with deep gaussian
crfs. In ECCV, 2016. 1
[21] L.-C. Chen, G. Papandreou, I. Kokkinos, K. Murphy, and
A. L. Yuille. Semantic image segmentation with deep con-
volutional nets and fully connected crfs. ICLR, 2015. 1, 7
[22] L.-C. Chen, G. Papandreou, I. Kokkinos, K. Murphy, and
A. L. Yuille. Deeplab: Semantic image segmentation with
deep convolutional nets, atrous convolution, and fully con-
nected crfs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.00915v2, 2016. 1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 12, 17, 18, 21, 31
[23] M. Cisse, Y. Adi, N. Neverova, and J. Keshet. Houdini: Fool-
ing deep structured prediction models. In NIPS, 2017. 3
[24] M. Cisse, P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, Y. Dauphin, and
N. Usunier. Parseval networks: Improving robustness to ad-
versarial examples. In ICML, 2017. 2, 12
[25] M. Cordts, M. Omran, S. Ramos, T. Rehfeld, M. Enzweiler,
R. Benenson, U. Franke, S. Roth, and B. Schiele. The
cityscapes dataset for semantic urban scene understanding.
In CVPR, 2016. 4
[26] E. D. Cubuk, B. Zoph, S. S. Schoenholz, and Q. V. Le. In-
triguing properties of adversarial examples. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.02846, 2017. 6
[27] J. Dai, K. He, and J. Sun. Boxsup: Exploiting bounding
boxes to supervise convolutional networks for semantic seg-
mentation. In ICCV, 2015. 7
[28] N. Dalvi, P. Domingos, S. Sanghai, D. Verma, et al. Ad-
versarial classification. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery
and data mining, pages 99–108. ACM, 2004. 1, 2
[29] G. K. Dziugaite, Z. Ghahramani, and D. M. Roy. A study of
the effect of jpg compression on adversarial images. In arXiv
preprint arXiv:1608.00853v1, 2016. 4, 6, 8
[30] A. Esteva, B. Kuprel, R. A. Novoa, J. Ko, S. M. Swetter,
H. M. Blau, and S. Thrun. Dermatologist-level classification
of skin cancer with deep neural networks. Nature, 2017. 1
[31] M. Everingham, L. Van Gool, C. K. Williams, J. Winn, and
A. Zisserman. The pascal visual object classes (voc) chal-
lenge. IJCV, 2010. 4
[32] I. Evtimov, K. Eykholt, E. Fernandes, T. Kohno, B. Li,
A. Prakash, A. Rahmati, and D. Song. Robust physical-
world attacks on machine learning models. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.08945v3, 2017. 1, 11
[33] A. Fawzi and P. Frossard. Manitest: Are classifiers really
invariant? In BMVC, 2015. 7
[34] R. Feinman, R. R. Curtin, S. Shintre, and A. B. Gardner. De-
tecting adversarial samples from artifacts. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1703.00410v2, 2017. 3
[35] V. Fischer, M. C. Kumar, J. H. Metzen, and T. Brox. Adver-
sarial examples for semantic image segmentation. In ICLR
Workshop, 2017. 3
[36] D. A. Forsyth, J. Malik, M. M. Fleck, H. Greenspan, T. Le-
ung, S. Belongie, C. Carson, and C. Bregler. Finding pictures
of objects in large collections of images. Springer, 1996. 5
[37] J. Gao, B. Wang, and Y. Qi. Deepmask: Masking dnn models
for robustness against adversarial samples. In ICLR Work-
shop, 2017. 12
[38] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and
harnessing adversarial examples. In ICLR, 2015. 1, 3, 5, 12
[39] K. Grosse, P. Manoharan, N. Papernot, M. Backes, and
P. McDaniel. On the (statistical) detection of adversarial ex-
amples. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06280v1, 2017. 3
[40] S. Gu and L. Rigazio. Towards deep neural network archi-
tectures robust to adversarial examples. In ICLR Workshop,
2015. 1
[41] C. Guo, M. Rana, M. Cisse´, and L. van der Maaten. Counter-
ing adversarial images using input transformations. In ICLR,
2018. 2, 3, 9, 11
[42] B. Hariharan, P. Arbela´ez, L. Bourdev, S. Maji, and J. Malik.
Semantic contours from inverse detectors. In ICCV, 2011. 4,
17
[43] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learning
for image recognition. In CVPR, 2016. 1, 4, 5
[44] W. He, J. Wei, X. Chen, N. Carlini, and D. Song. Adversar-
ial example defenses: Ensembles of weak defenses are not
strong. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.04701v1, 2017. 1, 3
[45] J. F. Henriques and A. Vedaldi. Warped convolutions: Effi-
cient invariance to spatial transformations. In ICML, 2017.
7
[46] J. Huang, V. Rathod, C. Sun, M. Zhu, A. Korattikara,
A. Fathi, I. Fischer, Z. Wojna, Y. Song, S. Guadarrama, et al.
Speed/accuracy trade-offs for modern convolutional object
detectors. In CVPR, 2017. 18
[47] J. Janai, F. Gu¨ney, A. Behl, and A. Geiger. Computer vision
for autonomous vehicles: Problems, datasets and state-of-
the-art. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.05519v1, 2017. 1
[48] Y. Jia, E. Shelhamer, J. Donahue, S. Karayev, J. Long, R. Gir-
shick, S. Guadarrama, and T. Darrell. Caffe: Convolu-
tional architecture for fast feature embedding. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1408.5093, 2014. 17
[49] G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J. Kochen-
derfer. Reluplex: An efficient smt solver for verifying deep
neural networks. In International Conference on Computer
Aided Verification, pages 97–117. Springer, 2017. 3
[50] A. Kerckhoffs. La cryptographie militaire. Journal des sci-
ences militaires, 9:5–83, 1883. 9, 11
[51] P. W. Koh and P. Liang. Understanding black-box predictions
via influence functions. In ICML, 2017. 5
[52] P. Kra¨henbu¨hl and V. Koltun. Efficient inference in fully
connected CRFs with Gaussian edge potentials. In NIPS,
2011. 11, 31
[53] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks. In
NIPS. 2012. 1
[54] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial ex-
amples in the physical world. In ICLR Workshop, 2017. 1,
10, 11
[55] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial ma-
chine learning at scale. In ICLR, 2017. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
13
[56] F. Liao, M. Liang, Y. Dong, T. Pang, J. Zhu, and X. Hu. De-
fense against adversarial attacks using high-level representa-
tion guided denoiser. In CVPR, 2018. 2, 3, 11
[57] G. Lin, C. Shen, and I. Reid. Efficient piecewise training of
deep structured models for semantic segmentation. In CVPR,
2016. 7
[58] T.-Y. Lin, M. Maire, S. Belongie, J. Hays, P. Perona, D. Ra-
manan, P. Dolla´r, and C. L. Zitnick. Microsoft coco: Com-
mon objects in context. In ECCV. 2014. 4, 17
[59] Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into transfer-
able adversarial examples and black-box attacks. In ICLR,
2017. 2, 3, 4, 5
[60] J. Long, E. Shelhamer, and T. Darrell. Fully convolutional
networks for semantic segmentation. In CVPR, 2015. 1, 4,
5, 12, 17, 18
[61] J. Lu, H. Sibai, E. Fabry, and D. Forsyth. No need to
worry about adversarial examples in object detection in au-
tonomous vehicles. In CVPR Workshop, 2017. 10, 11
[62] J. Lu, H. Sibai, E. Fabry, and D. Forsyth. Standard detectors
aren’t (currently) fooled by physical adversarial stop signs.
In arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.03337v1, 2017. 11
[63] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to adver-
sarial attacks. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083v2, 2017.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 13
[64] J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and B. Bischoff. On
detecting adversarial perturbations. In ICLR, 2017. 3
[65] J. H. Metzen, M. C. Kumar, T. Brox, and V. Fischer. Uni-
versal adversarial perturbations against semantic image seg-
mentation. In ICCV, 2017. 3
[66] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and
P. Frossard. Universal adversarial perturbations. In CVPR,
2017. 3
[67] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural net-
works. In CVPR, 2016. 3
[68] K. P. Murphy. Machine learning: a probabilistic perspective.
MIT press, 2012. 12
[69] N. Narodytska and S. P. Kasiviswanathan. Simple black-
box adversarial perturbations for deep networks. In CVPRW,
2017. 3
[70] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Transfer-
ability in machine learning: from phenomena to black-
box attacks using adversarial samples. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1605.07277v1, 2016. 1
[71] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against machine
learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM,
2017. 2, 3, 13
[72] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversar-
ial settings. In Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE
European Symposium on, 2016. 3
[73] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami.
Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against
deep neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, 2016. 1, 2, 12, 13
[74] A. Paszke, A. Chaurasia, S. Kim, and E. Culurciello. Enet:
A deep neural network architecture for real-time semantic
segmentation. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.02147v1, 2016.
4, 5, 6, 18
[75] B. Pepik, R. Benenson, T. Ritschel, and B. Schiele. What is
holding back convnets for detection? In German Conference
on Pattern Recognition, pages 517–528. Springer, 2015. 7
[76] A. Prakash, N. Moran, S. Garber, A. DiLillo, and J. Storer.
Deflecting adversarial attacks with pixel deflection. In
CVPR, 2018. 3
[77] M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, and M. K. Reiter. Ac-
cessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-
the-art face recognition. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, 2016. 1, 10
[78] E. Shelhamer, J. Long, and T. Darrell. Fully convolutional
networks for semantic segmentation. PAMI, 39(4):640–651,
2017. 17
[79] E. Shelhamer, K. Rakelly, J. Hoffman, and T. Darrell. Clock-
work convnets for video semantic segmentation. In ECCV
2016 Workshop, pages 852–868. Springer, 2016. 17, 18
[80] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman. Very deep convolutional
networks for large-scale image recognition. In ICLR, 2015.
1, 4, 5
[81] Y. Song, T. Kim, S. Nowozin, S. Ermon, and N. Kushman.
Pixeldefend: Leveraging generative models to understand
and defend against adversarial examples. In ICLR, 2018. 3
[82] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and S. Kouichi. One pixel at-
tack for fooling deep neural networks. In arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.08864, 2017. 3
[83] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. In ICLR, 2014. 1, 2, 3, 5
[84] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, D. Boneh, and P. Mc-
Daniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses.
In arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204v2, 2017. 3, 5
[85] J. Uesato, B. O’Donoghue, A. v. d. Oord, and P. Kohli. Ad-
versarial risk and the dangers of evaluating against weak at-
tacks. In arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.05666, 2018. 3, 7, 11
[86] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Z. Ren, and A. Yuille. Mitigating
adversarial effects through randomization. In ICLR, 2018. 2,
3, 7, 9, 11
[87] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Y. Zhou, L. Xie, and A. Yuille.
Adversarial examples for semantic segmentation and object
detection. In ICCV, 2017. 3
[88] W. Xu, D. Evans, and Y. Qi. Feature squeezing: Detect-
ing adversarial examples in deep neural networks. In arXiv
preprint arXiv:1704.01155v1, 2017. 3
[89] X. Xu, X. Chen, C. Liu, A. Rohrbach, T. Darell, and D. Song.
Can you fool ai with adversarial examples on a visual turing
test? In arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.08693v1, 2017. 3
[90] F. Yu and V. Koltun. Multi-scale context aggregation by di-
lated convolutions. In ICLR, 2016. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19,
22, 23
[91] H. Zhao, X. Qi, X. Shen, J. Shi, and J. Jia. Icnet for real-time
semantic segmentation on high-resolution images. In arXiv
preprint arXiv:1704.08545v1, 2017. 2, 5, 6, 18, 22
[92] H. Zhao, J. Shi, X. Qi, X. Wang, and J. Jia. Pyramid scene
parsing network. In CVPR, 2017. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 17, 18, 19,
22
[93] S. Zheng, S. Jayasumana, B. Romera-Paredes, V. Vineet,
Z. Su, D. Du, C. Huang, and P. Torr. Conditional random
fields as recurrent neural networks. In ICCV, 2015. 1, 2, 4,
12, 17, 18, 31
Appendix
This supplementary material details the DNNmodels we
analysed, and experiments we omitted from the main paper
since they follow similar trends. Section A provides further
details about the experimental set-up, including the various
DNNs used in the experiments. Section B shows qualitative
examples of the adversarial attacks we studied. Section C
presents further experimental results about “The robustness
of different networks” (Sec. 5 of the main paper). Similarly,
Section D shows more experimental results about “Multi-
scale Processing and Transferability of Adversarial Exam-
ples” (Sec. 6 of the main paper). Finally, Section E presents
further experimental results on the “Effect of CRFs on Ad-
versarial Robustness” (Sec. 8 of the main paper).
A. Experimental setup
This section details the DNN models, additional infor-
mation about the Cityscapes dataset and the software and
hardware used in the experiments.
A.1. Software and hardware setup
We use the Caffe [48] deep learning framework for all
experiments, since most publicly available segmentation
models are implemented using this library. Our experiments
are performed on either a Nvidia M40 or P100 GPU which
have 12GB and 16GB of memory respectively.
A.2. Description of models
We detail each model in this section. Tab. 3 shows
the performance of publicly available models on the Pas-
cal VOC validation set. Tab. 4 compares the Intersection
over Union (IoU) obtained by models that we have retrained
compared to the original author’s performance where avail-
able. Tab. 5 shows the performance of publicly available
models on the Cityscapes validation set. Finally, Tab. 6 lists
the number of parameters in each of the models.
FCN8s [60]. We retrained the FCN8s (VGG) network on
Pascal VOC with additional annotations from SBD [42] and
MS-COCO [58]. The publicly available model of FCN8s is
not trained with MS-COCO, which is why we retrained it
ourselves. As shown in Tab. 4, we obtain an IoU of 68.7%
on the VOC validation set, whilst the original authors who
did not train on MS-COCO obtained 65.5% [78].
For the Cityscapes dataset, we used the publicly avail-
able VGG model2 from [79].
We trained FCN8s with a ResNet-101 backbone on Pas-
cal VOC since no publicly available model was available.
As shown in Tab. 4, the IoU on clean inputs of this version
2https://github.com/shelhamer/clockwork-fcn
MD5 checksum of Caffe model: fcae4fdc759f9f461fffc7cc3baa96c6
Table 3: Networks with public models, evaluated on the
VOC validation set
Model Name IoU [%]
CRF-RNN [93] 72.8
Dilated Frontend [90] 67.1
Dilated Context [90] 70.4
SegNet [7] 43.0
is close to the VGG version. We are not aware of any other
published work to compare this number to.
Deeplab v2 [22]. We cannot use the publicly released
models for the Pascal VOC dataset, since they have been
trained on the entire validation set as well. Hence, we use
the authors’ publicly released training code3 to retrain their
networks without the VOC validation set.
We retrained the Deeplab v2 network with ResNet-101
and VGG backbones on Pascal VOC, achieving similar per-
formance to the original authors as shown in Tab. 4. Note
that the authors [22] reported results from ablation experi-
ments on the VOC validation set, which we compare to in
Tab. 4. However, these models have never been released.
For CRF post-processing, we used the hyperparameters
used by the original authors. As the weights of our trained
model are different to the authors, it is possible that differ-
ent CRF hyperparameters that obtain a higher IoU on the
validation set exist.
PSPNet [92]. We used the publicly available model4 for
our experiments on Cityscapes. As the public VOC model
has been trained on the entire validation set, we cannot
use it for our experiments. Consequently, we retrained this
model ourselves achieving comparable results to the orig-
inal authors (Tab. 4). We followed the training procedure
described in the original paper where possible. However,
the original authors trained the model using 16 GPUs al-
lowing an effective batch size of 16. Due to our limited
computational resources, we could only train on a single
GPU using a batch size of 1. The large batch size enabled
the original authors to compute better batch statistics for
batch normalisation. When using a batch size of 1, the vari-
ance in the batch statistics is too high to perform batch nor-
malisation. As a result, we “froze” our batch normalisation
layers, and used the batch statistics (mean and variance) of
the ImageNet-pretrained ResNet-101 model. This is com-
mon practice in training semantic segmentation [22] and ob-
3https://bitbucket.org/aquariusjay/
deeplab-public-ver2.git
4https://github.com/hszhao/PSPNet
MD5 checksum of Caffe model: 29bbdf0ce4d2a6546ed473656db1d6e2
Table 4: Retrained models on VOC validation set. Details about FCN8, Deeplab v2 and PSPNet can be found in Sec. A.2.
Model Name IoU [%] IoU of authors [%]
FCN8s (VGG) [60] 68.7 –
FCN8s (ResNet) [60] 68.8 –
Deeplab v2 ASPP (VGG) [22] 66.9 68.9
Deeplab v2 ASPP (ResNet) [22] 73.3 –
Deeplab v2 Multiscale ASPP (ResNet) [22] 73.9 76.3
Deeplab v2 Multiscale ASPP (ResNet) + CRF post-processing [22] 74.9 77.7
PSPNet [92] 75.9 –
PSPNet [92] (test set) 79.0 85.4
Table 5: Networks with public models on Cityscapes vali-
dation set. We have reported the IoU at 1024×512 inputs, as
well as the original 2048× 1024 if the network was trained
using full-resolution crops.
Model name
IoU at
1024× 512
IoU at
2048× 1024
E-Net [74] 53.4 –
ICNet [91] 56.5 67.2
FCN8s (VGG) [79] 62.1 66.4
Dilated Frontend [90] 59.0 64.6
Dilated Context [90] 62.3 68.6
PSPNet [92] 74.4 79.7
ject detection [46] networks where batch sizes are typically
small.
As shown in Tab. 4, our reimplementation of PSPNet on
VOC achieves comparable results to the original authors,
even though it has been trained on 1449 fewer images (the
VOC validation set). We compared our implementation to
the authors on the held-out test set (evaluation is performed
on an online server) as the performance on the validation set
is not reported in the original paper.
CRF-RNN [93]. We used the publicly available model for
Pascal VOC (trained on MS-COCO)5.
DilatedNet [90]. We used the public Pascal VOC and
Cityscapes models6.
ICNet [91]. We used the public Cityscapes model7.
5https://github.com/torrvision/crfasrnn
MD5 checksum of Caffe model: bc4926ad00ecc9a1c627db82377ecf56
6https://github.com/fyu/dilation.
MD5 checksum for Pascal VOC: 7a44221dbc2611529bff32029ad1f6e2
MD5 checksum for Cityscapes: 0de4d78b5f9692f2aba5e7ed88f93ccb
7https://github.com/hszhao/ICNet
MD5 checksum of Caffe model: c7038630c4b6c869afaaadd811bdb539
Table 6: The number of parameters in each of the DNN
models evaluated in this paper. As all the networks are
stored as 32-bit/4-byte floating point numbers, we reported
the number of parameters in megabytes (MB).
Model Name Dataset
Number of
parameters (MB)
E-Net Cityscapes 1.5
ICNet Cityscapes 30.1
PSPNet (ResNet-101) Cityscapes 260.2
Dilated Frontend (VGG) Cityscapes 512.4
FCN8s (VGG) Cityscapes 512.5
Dilated Context (VGG) Cityscapes 512.6
Segnet (VGG) Pascal 112.4
Deeplab v2 (VGG) Pascal 144.5
FCN8s (ResNet-101) Pascal 162.9
Deeplab v2 (ResNet-101) Pascal 168.4
PSPNet (ResNet-101) Pascal 272.7
Dilated Frontend (VGG) Pascal 512.4
FCN8s (VGG) Pascal 513.0
CRF-RNN (VGG) Pascal 513.0
Dilated Context (VGG) Pascal 538.4
E-Net [74]. We used the public Cityscapes model8.
SegNet [7]. We used the public Pascal VOC model9.
A.3. Cityscapes dataset
Tab. 5 shows the performance of various publicly avail-
able models on the Cityscapes validation set consisting of
500 images. Cityscapes images are captured at a high res-
olution of 2048 × 1024, which is too large to fit into GPU
memory for most networks. With the exception of E-Net
[74] (which is trained on half-resolution images), the other
8https://github.com/TimoSaemann/ENet
MD5 checksum of Caffe model: d9aabd630cf6bc29c48ea55a86124e14
9https://github.com/alexgkendall/
SegNet-Tutorial/blob/master/Example_Models/
segnet_model_zoo.md
MD5 checksum of Caffemodel: 6e01077e3cda996f95b2a82ea4641a4c
networks we evaluated are trained on smaller crops of full-
resolution images. Thereafter, at test time, authors use dif-
ferent tiling strategies [90, 92] to process parts of an im-
age at full resolution before combining the partial results.
To make a fairer comparison between models, we process
all images at half-resolution so that tiling is not required.
In Tab. 5, we show the IoU at the resolution we tested on,
1024× 512. And if the model was also trained on full reso-
lution crops, we also include the IoU of the network on full
resolution inputs.
B. Qualitative results
Figure 11 visualises adversarial perturbations of varying
ℓ∞ norms, showing how the perturbations only become vis-
ible to the naked eye when the l∞ of the perturbation, ǫ, is
8 (when viewed on screen). Figure 12 shows the results of
the four adversarial attacks considered in this paper when
applied on the same image from the Pascal VOC dataset on
the Deeplab v2 network. Finally, Fig. 13 compares the out-
puts of different networks to the Iterative FGSM ll attack
for varying values of ǫ on the Cityscapes dataset.
Input image Perturbation Adversarial Image
ǫ x r xadv = x+ r
0.25
1
4
8
16
32
Figure 11: A visualisation of adversarial perturbations of varying ℓ∞ norms. The perturbation, in the middle column, when
added to the input, produces the adversarial example that fools neural networks. Note that the mean RGB value (of the Pascal
VOC dataset) is already added to the perturbation, resulting in the grey background. This is required for visualisation as
the perturbation can be negative, and RGB images are stored as positive integers ∈ [0, 255]. For ǫ = 0.25, the adversarial
image and input image are actually identical if rounded to integers (as RGB images are typically represented). Nevertheless,
perturbations of this norm have fooled every neural network studied in this paper. Perturbations become noticeable when
viewed on screen at around ǫ = 8. In this figure, perturbations were created using FGSM on Deeplab v2.
Input image Original prediction Ground truth
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Figure 12: A comparison of different adversarial attacks on the Deeplab v2 Mulitscale ASPP network [22], on a common
image from Pascal VOC. As expected, iterative attacks (last two columns) are more effective than single-step ones (first two
columns). Higher l∞ norms of the perturbation, ǫ, also degrade the network’s prediction more.
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Figure 13: Comparison of ICNet, Dilated Context and PSPNet when attacked by Iterative FGSM ll, for different values of
the l∞ norm, ǫ. Note how each network is affected differently, with PSPNet the most robust. ǫ = 0 is the original prediction
of the network, since no perturbation is added here.
C. Robustness of Different Architectures
The main paper presented results using the FGSM
and Iterative FGSM ll attacks for both Pascal VOC and
Cityscapes datasets. In this section, we present results for
the targeted, single-step FGSM ll and untargeted Iterative
FGSM attacks as well. Furthermore, we also include the
Absolute IoU scores for each attack for different l∞ pertur-
bations.
C.1. Results of other attacks
Figures 14 and 15 show results of the FGSM ll and It-
erative FGSM attacks on the VOC and Cityscapes datasets
respectively. Our primary observations from the main paper
are mostly consistent on these attacks as well:
• ResNet based networks are more robust than models
based on VGG.
• DilatedNet [90] without its “Context” module is typi-
cally more robust than the full, more accurate network.
• E-Net and ICNet show similar robustness to Dilated-
Net on the Cityscapes dataset. It is only for the FGSM
ll attack for ǫ ≥ 4 that DilatedNet is robust than both
of these lightweight networks.
• Single-step attacks (FGSM ll) are particularly effec-
tive on Cityscapes at high ǫ values. They are more
effective at fooling networks than iterative methods as
well. This was unexpected, and not observed on Pascal
VOC.
• PSPNet, which achieves the highest IoU on clean in-
puts, is typically not the most robust network on Pascal
VOC.
C.2. Result tables of Absolute IoU
In contrast to the main paper that showed the IoU Ratio
for various attacks, Tables 7 through 10 show the absolute
IoU for different models for each of the FGSM, FGSM ll,
Iterative FGSM and Iterative FGSM ll attacks on the Pascal
VOC dataset. Additionally, Tables 11 through 14 show the
absolute IoU for different models on the Cityscapes dataset.
Note that PSPNet, which achieves the highest IoU on
clean inputs, does not usually achieve the highest abso-
lute IoU when attacked on the Pascal VOC dataset. When
considering 4 adversarial attacks, and 8 ǫ values, PSPNet
achieves the highest absolute IoU in only 2 out of 32 cases.
Moreover, it never achieves the highest absolute IoU for im-
perceptible perturbations (0 < ǫ ≤ 4).
Additionally, the highest absolute IoU for any ǫ value is
always from a ResNet-based model (Deeplab v2, FCN8s
(ResNet) or PSPNet) on the Pascal VOC dataset. On
Cityscapes, FCN8s (VGG) is sometimes the most robust
network at high ǫ values. However, the performance of all
the networks is severely degraded at this point.
(a) Untargeted Iterative FGSM attack (b) Targeted FGSM ll. attack
Figure 14: Adversarial robustness of state-of-the-art models on the Pascal VOC dataset. As with the FGSM and Iterative
FGSM ll attacks in the main paper, models based on the ResNet backbone are more robust. Deeplab v2 is generally the most
robust network, except on the Targeted FGSM attack for ǫ ≥ 4. The Iterative FGSM attack is also more effective at fooling
the networks than the single-step Targeted FGSM attack, as shown by the lower IoU ratios.
(a) Untargeted Iterative FGSM attack (b) Targeted FGSM ll. attack
Figure 15: Adversarial robustness of state-of-the-art models on the Cityscapes dataset. As with the FGSM and Iterative
FGSM ll attacks in the main paper, PSPNet is typically the most robust. Once again, DilatedNet without its “Context”
module is slightly more robust than the full, more accurate network. The single-step FGSM ll attack is also more effective
at higher ǫ values than the Iterative FGSM attack. This is unexpected, but was also observed in the main paper between the
FGSM and Iterative FGSM ll attacks.
Table 7: The absolute IoU on the Pascal VOC dataset for various models when attacked with FGSM. This is evaluated for
eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
SegNet (VGG) 43.0 32.3 25.9 19.5 14.8 11.7 9.7 6.9 4.0
Deeplab v2 ASPP (VGG) 66.9 55.3 44.1 31.7 22.5 17.2 13.9 11.8 9.1
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 67.1 56.7 45.7 33.8 24.2 19.2 16.1 12.2 8.2
FCN8s (VGG) 68.7 55.7 45.4 36.1 28.8 23.9 19.9 16.1 10.3
FCN8s (ResNet) 68.8 55.9 49.9 44.2 39.5 35.9 32.0 24.8 12.8
Dilated Context (VGG) 70.4 55.8 44.9 34.4 26.0 20.6 17.2 13.9 9.0
Deeplab v2 ASPP (ResNet) 73.3 61.6 52.7 43.3 35.9 30.7 27.7 24.6 18.5
Deeplab v2 ASPP MS (ResNet) 73.9 66.9 60.9 54.1 47.9 43.2 39.2 35.7 28.5
PSPNet (ResNet) 75.9 66.8 59.0 48.9 39.8 33.8 29.2 26.7 21.2
Table 8: The absolute IoU on the Pascal VOC dataset for various models when attacked with FGSM ll. This is evaluated for
eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
SegNet (VGG) 43.0 36.2 27.4 17.6 11.4 8.3 6.7 5.4 4.1
Deeplab v2 ASPP (VGG) 66.9 61.5 52.3 34.6 17.3 9.5 7.0 6.1 5.6
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 67.1 61.6 51.9 35.8 19.1 10.6 6.6 5.5 4.4
FCN8s (VGG) 68.7 61.5 52.5 38.6 24.4 15.5 11.4 8.8 6.2
FCN8s (ResNet) 68.8 58.7 52.9 47.7 43.6 41.0 36.8 28.6 13.6
Dilated Context (VGG) 70.4 61.7 50.5 32.5 16.5 9.4 6.6 5.6 4.3
Deeplab v2 ASPP (ResNet) 73.3 67.8 60.4 49.1 37.5 30.0 25.7 22.0 17.2
Deeplab v2 ASPP MS (ResNet) 73.9 71.5 67.4 59.5 48.4 38.0 31.1 25.8 20.4
PSPNet (ResNet) 75.9 69.8 62.1 51.8 41.8 36.2 32.1 29.8 26.6
Table 9: The absolute IoU on the Pascal VOC dataset for various models when attacked with Iterative FGSM. This is
evaluated for eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
SegNet (VGG) 43.0 32.3 25.9 21.3 12.7 8.9 5.6 3.8 2.8
Deeplab v2 ASPP (VGG) 66.9 55.3 44.1 40.3 26.0 12.5 7.6 4.7 3.4
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 67.1 56.7 45.7 42.1 24.4 13.4 9.1 5.6 4.1
FCN8s (VGG) 68.7 55.7 45.4 39.9 25.8 16.5 10.0 7.1 4.9
FCN8s (ResNet) 68.8 55.9 49.9 42.0 31.0 23.3 14.2 9.1 5.7
Dilated Context (VGG) 70.4 55.8 44.9 41.2 27.8 16.7 11.9 8.6 8.2
Deeplab v2 ASPP (ResNet) 73.3 61.6 52.7 47.3 32.2 22.1 13.1 7.5 5.3
Deeplab v2 ASPP MS (ResNet) 73.9 66.9 60.9 55.8 40.9 29.6 20.9 16.3 14.0
PSPNet (ResNet) 75.9 66.8 59.0 51.1 30.8 16.5 7.8 5.2 2.8
Table 10: The absolute IoU on the Pascal VOC dataset for various models when attacked with Iterative FGSM ll. This is
evaluated for eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
SegNet (VGG) 43.0 36.2 27.4 22.0 11.4 6.7 5.3 4.1 3.7
Deeplab v2 ASPP (VGG) 66.9 61.5 52.3 49.0 28.0 12.1 6.7 5.8 4.8
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 67.1 61.6 51.9 49.1 27.8 10.8 5.4 4.0 3.7
FCN8s (VGG) 68.7 61.5 52.5 52.5 33.0 17.1 10.4 8.4 6.8
FCN8s (ResNet) 68.8 58.7 52.9 47.8 37.6 28.9 18.2 12.2 7.9
Dilated Context (VGG) 70.4 61.7 50.5 48.9 22.9 9.2 5.6 5.0 4.1
Deeplab v2 ASPP (ResNet) 73.3 67.8 60.4 56.9 39.6 21.1 11.3 7.7 6.3
Deeplab v2 ASPP MS (ResNet) 73.9 71.5 67.4 65.2 52.6 30.2 15.5 9.1 7.1
PSPNet (ResNet) 75.9 69.8 62.1 58.5 37.2 20.0 11.1 7.9 5.1
Table 11: The absolute IoU on the Cityscapes dataset for various models when attacked with FGSM. This is evaluated for
eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
ENet 53.4 39.6 35.6 31.0 24.0 13.2 5.8 4.1 1.4
ICNet 56.5 47.0 41.3 35.5 28.5 16.8 4.5 2.4 0.8
FCN8 (VGG) 62.1 46.0 38.0 31.9 27.8 23.9 16.2 7.7 3.9
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 59.0 46.3 38.1 31.1 25.7 20.7 13.3 5.0 1.7
Dilated Context (VGG) 62.3 48.4 39.0 31.6 26.0 20.8 13.3 4.8 1.8
PSPNet (ResNet) 74.4 58.5 52.9 48.9 46.0 36.3 16.0 2.8 1.9
Table 12: The absolute IoU on the Cityscapes dataset for various models when attacked with FGSM ll. This is evaluated for
eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
ENet 53.4 38.5 31.7 24.2 17.0 8.9 4.3 3.8 1.4
ICNet 56.5 47.2 40.5 33.2 25.1 13.4 3.4 2.3 0.8
FCN8 (VGG) 62.1 53.8 46.0 38.4 32.5 26.3 14.9 6.4 3.8
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 59.0 50.9 42.0 32.8 24.6 16.8 8.7 3.1 1.7
Dilated Context (VGG) 62.3 53.2 42.5 31.8 22.8 15.1 8.2 3.0 1.7
PSPNet (ResNet) 74.4 64.9 59.1 55.0 51.3 39.5 16.5 2.8 1.9
Table 13: The absolute IoU on the Cityscapes dataset for various models when attacked with Iterative FGSM. This is evalu-
ated for eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
ENet 53.4 39.6 35.6 22.6 14.2 9.3 5.7 3.6 2.7
ICNet 56.5 47.0 41.3 30.9 22.4 13.6 7.6 4.8 3.4
FCN8 (VGG) 62.1 46.0 38.0 31.1 19.1 11.1 5.8 4.0 3.2
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 59.0 46.3 38.1 30.6 18.1 10.0 5.4 3.5 2.8
Dilated Context (VGG) 62.3 48.4 39.0 31.4 18.1 9.6 5.1 3.4 2.7
PSPNet (ResNet) 74.4 58.5 52.9 40.2 25.4 16.4 8.9 5.7 4.3
Table 14: The absolute IoU on the Cityscapes dataset for various models when attacked with Iterative FGSM ll. This is
evaluated for eight different values of the ℓ∞ norm of the perturbation, ǫ. ǫ = 0 represents the IoU on clean inputs.
Network ℓ∞ norm of perturbation, ǫ0 0.25 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32
ENet 53.4 38.5 31.7 19.2 14.6 9.2 5.1 3.5 2.7
ICNet 56.5 47.2 40.5 33.8 22.4 14.5 8.9 6.8 5.5
FCN8 (VGG) 62.1 53.8 46.0 36.5 24.8 14.0 7.7 5.9 4.9
Dilated Frontend (VGG) 59.0 50.9 42.0 31.8 20.0 10.5 5.3 4.7 4.0
Dilated Context (VGG) 62.3 53.2 42.5 32.2 19.9 8.8 4.8 3.6 2.8
PSPNet (ResNet) 74.4 64.9 59.1 46.1 36.5 26.1 16.9 11.5 8.8
D. Multiscale Processing and Transferability
of Adversarial Examples
This section details additional results with both Deeplab
v2 and FCN8s.
D.1. Deeplab v2
Table 15 shows the performance, measured in IoU, on
the VOC validation set when the input image is processed
at different resolutions (50%, 75%, 100%). The fact that
a different IoU is obtained for each input resolution, even
though the weights of the network are the same, confirms
that the network is not scale invariant. Note that the ver-
sion of Deeplab which processes images at all the afore-
mentioned resolutions, and max-pools the prediction at each
pixel obtains the highest IoU. An alternative to max-pooling
the predictions from each scale is to average-pool them.
This method gives an insignificant improvement in accu-
racy, but does improve robustness as shown in Fig. 16.
Table 15: Performance of Deeplab v2 (ResNet) on the VOC
validation set when processing images at different resolu-
tions
Model Name IoU [%]
Deeplab v2 50% scale 67.8
Deeplab v2 75% scale 71.9
Deeplab v2 100% scale 73.3
Deeplab v2 100% scale (average pooling) 73.4
Deeplab v2 Multiscale (max pooling) 73.9
D.1.1 Average-pooling instead of max-pooling
As shown in Fig. 16, average-pooling the results from
each scale is also more robust to all the adversarial attacks
we tested compared to the single-scale version of Deeplab
v2. In fact, multiscale processing (either max- or average-
pooling) achieves a higher IoU Ratio at almost all ǫ values
for each attack.
Table 17 also shows that black-box attacks generated
from multiscale-averaging also transfer better to single
scales of Deeplab v2, for all four adversarial attacks consid-
ered in this paper. This is similar to the case of max-pooling
as shown in the main paper.
D.1.2 Transferability experiments using the FGSM ll
and Iterative FGSM attacks
Table 18 shows the transferability of adversarial attacks to
different scales of Deeplab v2 using the FGSM ll and Itera-
tive FGSM attacks. The main paper presented results using
the FGSM and Iterative FGSM ll attacks. However, our
Table 16: Performance of FCN8s when processing images
at different resolutions. As with Deeplab v2, max-pooling
the predictions from multiple scales achieves the best re-
sults.
Model Name IoU [%]
FCN8s 50% scale 60.8
FCN8s 75% scale 67.8
FCN8s 100% scale 68.7
FCN8s Multiscale 69.9
findings remain consistent on these different attacks. The
multiscale version of Deeplab v2 is the most robust to these
attacks (as also seen in Fig. 14 and 16), and black-box at-
tacks from it transfer the best to other scales of Deeplab v2.
D.1.3 Transferability experiments at multiple ǫ
values
Figure 17 shows the results of black-box attacks for multi-
ple ǫ values between different scales of Deeplab v2 for the
FGSM attack. The results are largely consistent with those
at ǫ = 8 as reported in the main paper – the multiscale ver-
sion of Deeplab v2 is the most robust to white-box attacks
and black-box attacks generated from it transfer the best to
other scales of Deeplab v2. Also note how the transferabil-
ity from each scale to another varies greatly. For example,
attacks generated from the 50% scale transfer very poorly
to 100% and vice versa.
D.2. FCN8s
Table 16 shows the IoU of FCN8s (VGG) as the input
resolution of the image is varied from the VOC dataset. As
with Deeplab v2, a multiscale version which max-pools the
predictions from each scale achieves the highest IoU.
The transferability experiments from Section 6 of the
paper are repeated on FCN8 in Tables 19 and 20. Note
that FCN8s has not been trained in a multiscale manner as
Deeplab v2, and it is rather done as a post-processing step.
Nevertheless, the results show a similar trend as Deeplab
v2: The multiscale network is more robust to white-box at-
tacks and black-box attacks generated from it transfer bet-
ter. This suggests that training the network in a multiscale
manner does not confer robustness to adversarial examples.
Rather it is the fact that CNNs are not scale invariant, and
that adversarial examples generated at one scale are not as
malignant at another. Finally Fig. 18 shows the transfer-
ability experiments at multiple ǫ values, as was done for
Deeplab v2 in the previous subsection.
(a) Untargeted attacks (b) Targeted attacks
Figure 16: Adversarial robustness of Deeplab ASPP (single-scale) and Deeplab Multiscale ASPP. We compare two types
of multiscale ensembling – max-pooling and average-pooling the predictions from each of the three scales of Deeplab v2
(ResNet 101). Note that both average- and max-pooling are more robust than just a single-scale model, achieving higher IoU
Ratios for almost every ǫ value for each attack on the Pascal VOC dataset.
Table 17: Transferability of adversarial examples generated from different scales of Deeplab v2 (columns) and evaluated
on different networks (rows). In this case, the outputs from each scale are average-pooled instead of max-pooled. The
underlined diagonals for each attack show white-box attacks. Off-diagonals, show transfer (black-box) attacks. The most
effective one in bold, is typically from the multiscale version of Deeplab v2. In the case of Iterative FGSM ll, black-box
attacks from the multiscale networks are sometimes even more effective than white-box ones.
Network evaluated
FGSM (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM ll (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
Deeplab v2 0.5 (ResNet) 37.3 70.5 84.8 48.8 18.0 92.0 96.9 12.1
Deeplab v2 0.75 (ResNet) 85.5 39.7 62.2 54.2 99.5 17.9 89.9 17.4
Deeplab v2 1 (ResNet) 93.6 57.9 37.7 51.7 100.0 79.0 15.5 9.6
Deeplab v2 Multiscale (ResNet) 75.1 54.2 59.0 51.6 95.2 84.9 87.5 16.7
Network evaluated
FGSM ll (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
Deeplab v2 50% (ResNet) 36.4 70.1 83.7 36.6 21.3 90.9 97.0 37.3
Deeplab v2 75% (ResNet) 89.9 37.4 61.6 39.9 99.1 20.0 88.6 44.1
Deeplab v2 100% (ResNet) 95.1 58.3 35.1 36.9 100.2 71.9 18.6 33.5
Deeplab v2 Multiscale (ResNet) 96.0 91.4 94.7 38.2 94.5 76.2 86.5 37.7
Table 18: Transferability of adversarial examples generated from different scales of Deeplab v2 (columns) and evaluated on
different networks (rows). As with the main paper, max-pooling is performed from the output of each scale. However, in
contrast to the main paper, the FGSM ll and Iterative FGSM attacks are reported. The underlined diagonals for each attack
show white-box attacks. Off-diagonals, show transfer (black-box) attacks. The most effective one in bold, is typically from
the multiscale version of Deeplab v2.
Network evaluated
FGSM ll (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
Deeplab v2 0.5 (ResNet) 36.4 70.1 83.7 46.0 21.3 90.9 97.0 39.2
Deeplab v2 0.75 (ResNet) 89.9 37.4 61.6 43.3 99.1 20.0 88.6 34.0
Deeplab v2 1 (ResNet) 95.1 58.3 35.1 33.9 100.2 71.9 18.6 22.0
Deeplab v2 Multiscale (ResNet) 90.7 60.8 68.9 42.1 96.5 81.9 87.5 29.2
Deeplab v2 (VGG) 95.1 69.9 63.8 61.9 98.5 86.9 86.3 81.2
FCN8 (VGG) 94.5 67.7 64.7 62.4 98.7 86.9 86.0 82.0
(a) Transfer attacks on Deeplab v2 50% scale (b) Transfer attacks on Deeplab v2 75% scale
(c) Transfer attacks on Deeplab v2 100% scale (d) Transfer attacks on Deeplab v2 Multiscale (max-pooling)
Figure 17: Black-box attacks on each scale of Deeplab v2, from each other scale, using adversarial perturbations generated
by FGSM for differing values of ǫ on the Pascal VOC dataset. In each figure, the last bar shows the “white-box” attack on the
network, where the attack is generated from the network that is being evaluated. This is typically the most powerful attack,
as expected. Note that attacks generated from the multiscale version of Deeplab v2 (using either max- or average-pooling)
produce the most effective black-box attacks across multiple ǫ values. The trend from the main paper, which only tabulated
the IoU Ratio for ǫ = 8, can thus be seen across all other ǫ values considered in this paper.
Table 19: Transferability of adversarial examples generated from different scales of FCN8s (VGG) (columns) and evaluated
on different networks (rows) on the Pascal VOC dataset. For the multiscale network, the outputs from each scale are max-
pooled. The underlined diagonals for each attack show white-box attacks. Off-diagonals, show transfer (black-box) attacks.
The most effective one in bold, is typically from the multiscale version of FCN8s.
Network evaluated
FGSM (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM ll (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
FCN8 50% 32.1 53.3 81.0 53.7 20.5 87.3 96.9 21.9
FCN8 75% 78.4 30.9 45.5 40.5 96.3 17.6 77.8 20.5
FCN8 100% 94.0 41.7 28.9 28.7 98.2 58.6 15.3 17.5
FCN8 Multiscale 79.1 42.8 53.3 47.8 97.5 79.3 85.2 20.0
Table 20: Transferability of adversarial examples generated from different scales of FCN8s (VGG) (columns) and evaluated
on different networks (rows) on the Pascal VOC dataset. For the multiscale network, the outputs from each scale are max-
pooled. The underlined diagonals for each attack show white-box attacks. Off-diagonals, show transfer (black-box) attacks.
The most effective one in bold, is typically from the multiscale version of FCN8s.
Network evaluated
FGSM ll (ǫ = 8) Iterative FGSM (ǫ = 8)
50% 75% 100% Multiscale 50% 75% 100% Multiscale
FCN8 50% 18.5 51.4 79.2 24.0 23.6 85.7 97.1 38.1
FCN8 75% 80.9 18.5 37.0 23.4 97.3 15.9 74.7 28.1
FCN8 100% 93.0 33.8 16.6 17.1 99.1 54.9 14.7 18.1
FCN8 Multiscale 87.5 40.0 60.3 21.1 96.4 74.5 82.3 25.1
(a) Transfer attacks on FCN8s 50% scale (b) Transfer attacks on FCN8s 75% scale
(c) Transfer attacks on FCN8s 100% scale (d) Transfer attacks on FCN8s Multiscale (max-pooling)
Figure 18: Black-box attacks on each scale of FCN8, from each other scale, using adversarial perturbations generated by
FGSM for differing values of ǫ on the Pascal VOC dataset. In each figure, the last bar shows the “white-box” attack on the
network, where the attack is generated from the network that is being evaluated. The results from this experiment are very
similar to Deeplab v2 – attacks generated from the multiscale network transfer the best to other scales. However, unlike
Deeplab v2, the FCN8s network in this case was not trained with multiscale ensembling. This was simply done at test-time.
This suggests that the increased robustness of multiscale networks to adversarial attacks, and their transferability to other
networks, is not a result of the training procedure, but rather the fact that these networks are not scale invariant.
E. Effect of CRFs on Adversarial Robustness
E.1. Adversarial Robustness and Smoothing
The pairwise term of DenseCRF [52] (which is inter-
preted as a neural network in CRF-RNN [93]) takes the
form of a weighted sum of a Bilateral and Gaussian filter.
ψp(xi, xj) = µ(xi, xj)
[
w1 exp
( |pi − pj |2
θα
+
|Ii − Ij |2
θβ
)
+
w2 exp
( |pi − pj |2
θγ
)]
. (8)
Increasing θα, θβ , θγ , w1 and w2 all correspond to
favouring smoother predictions. The compatibility func-
tion, µ(xi, xj), is given by the Potts model, and is equal
to 1 if xi 6= xj and 0 otherwise [52].
Figure 19 shows the effect of varying θα, Fig. 20 the ef-
fect of varying θβ and Fig. 21 the effect of varying both θγ
and w2. Note that in all cases, each of the other hyperpa-
rameters remains unchanged at the values from the public
CRF-RNN model.
In all of these cases, we can see that increasing the
smoothness does not correspond to increasing adversarial
robustness to the FGSM attack. Rather, as detailed in the
next subsection, there is a correlation between the confi-
dence of the prediction and robustness to the FGSM attack.
E.2. Results about the confidence on VOC
We empirically measured the confidence of the predic-
tions of CRF-RNN. This was done by recording the proba-
bility (from the softmax activation function) of the predicted
(highest-scoring) label, and also by calculating the entropy
of the marginal distribution over labels at each pixel in the
image. A lower entropy indicates a more certain or con-
fident prediction. This was then averaged over the Pascal
VOC validation set.
Figures 22 and 23 show the mean confidence and entropy
respectively as a function of the IoU Ratio. This is done for
the FGSM attack for all the ǫ values considered in the pa-
per. There is a clear correlation between the IoU Ratio and
the confidence of the prediction. Moreover, the results of
CRF-RNN are always more confident than FCN8s. Note
that multiple variants of CRF-RNN, using different θα, θβ
and θγ hyperparameter values were considered, as in Fig-
ures 19 through 21.
E.3. Experiments on Deeplab v2 with CRF
In contrast to CRF-RNN [93], a common approach is to
apply CRFs as a post-processing step, as done in Deeplab
[22]. We perform adversarial attacks on this by append-
ing the CRF-RNN layer of [93] onto the Deeplab v2 net-
work. This allows us to compute the gradient of the loss
with respect to the input image (required for all the attacks)
by backpropagating through the CRF-RNN layer. The pa-
rameters of the CRF-RNN layer appended to Deeplab v2
were manually set to the parameters used by the original
authors10 (who obtained them via cross-validation). Note
that appending the CRF-RNN layer to Deeplab v2 and us-
ing the same parameters as the authors produces output that
is identical to the post-processing code used by the original
authors. The difference is that this allows us to compute
gradients as well.
10http://liangchiehchen.com/projects/DeepLabv2_
resnet.html
Figure 19: The IoU Ratio of CRF-RNN for various values of the θα (filter bandwidth) hyperparameter when attacked with
FGSM on the Pascal VOC dataset. Increasing this hyperparameter visually smoothes the result further, but we can see that this
does not increase adversarial robustness. In fact, lower filter bandwidths of approximately θα = 1 provide more robustness.
Figure 20: The IoU Ratio of CRF-RNN for various values of the θβ (filter bandwidth) hyperparameter when attacked with
FGSM on the Pascal VOC dataset. Again, we can see that larger filter bandwidths, which encourage more spatial smoothness,
do not increase adversarial robustness.
Figure 21: The IoU Ratio of CRF-RNN for various values of the w2 and θγ parameters when attacked with FGSM on the
Pascal VOC dataset. Increasing the weight of the Gaussian term (w2) tends to increase robustness. However, we still see that
lower filter bandwidths (θγ) tend to provide more robustness.
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Figure 22: The mean probability of the highest-scoring class for each pixel, averaged over the Pascal VOC validation set.
This is performed for the FGSM attack for multiple ǫ values. ǫ = 0 corresponds to clean inputs (no adversarial attack). Note
how FCN8s (the purple dot) consistently has the lowest mean probability. This probability is significantly lower than other
variants of CRF-RNN (with varying θα, θβ , θγ), shown by the other coloured dots. Moreover, note the correlation between
the confidence in the prediction, and adversarial robustness to the FGSM attack. Additionally, the probability of the predicted
class remains high (above 90%) for all models throughout all adversarial attacks.
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Figure 23: The mean entropy of the marginal distribution over all labels at each pixel, averaged over all images in the
Pascal VOC validation set. A lower entropy corresponds to a more confident prediction. This is performed for the FGSM
attack for multiple ǫ values. ǫ = 0 corresponds to clean inputs (no adversarial attack). Note how FCN8s (the purple dot)
consistently has the highest mean entropy (least confidence). This entropy is significantly higher than other variants of CRF-
RNN (with varying θα, θβ , θγ), shown by the other coloured dots. Moreover, note the correlation between the confidence in
the prediction, and adversarial robustness to the FGSM attack.
